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Abstract 
The negative relation between asset growth and subsequent stock returns is known as the 
asset growth anomaly. We propose that overreaction to growth opportunities is the 
source of the asset growth anomaly. This suggests that growth firms as opposed to 
mature firms, and firms with longer series of asset growth should experience a stronger 
asset growth anomaly. Our evidence supports these predictions.  
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1.!Introduction 
The efficient market hypothesis has faced a long line of challenges from persistent 
anomalies (see Schwert, 2003, for a survey). The asset growth anomaly, where 
subsequent returns are negatively related to asset growth, is one of the latest to be 
investigated. Cooper et al. (2008) and Fama and French (2008) show that firms have 
lower subsequent returns when they expand their assets and, conversely, higher 
subsequent returns when their assets contract1; since the Fama–French 3-factor model 
cannot explain the returns of portfolios sorted by asset growth, this negative relationship 
between asset growth and future stock returns at the cross-sectional level is referred to as 
the asset growth anomaly. 
While both rational and mispricing explanations of the asset growth anomaly 
have been proposed, much of the recent evidence in the literature has been focused on 
rational explanations via q-theory. The latter is largely inconclusive2, and mispricing as an 
explanation has received considerably less attention. Given the mixed evidence to date, 
the purpose of this paper is to extend our understanding of the drivers of this 
phenomenon by focusing on investor overreaction as an explanation of the asset growth 
anomaly. Such a conjecture has its origin in the anomaly literature (Cooper et al., 2008). 
Extending their finding, if the asset growth anomaly is driven by investor overreaction to 
                                                   
 
1 For events associated with expansion, Loughran and Ritter (1995) show that firms with equity issuance 
earn lower stock returns. For events associated with contraction, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) show 
that firms with share repurchase earn higher returns. 
2 The rational explanation of the asset growth anomaly relies on the q-theory model, which studies the 
investment–return relationship from a production-based asset pricing or firm optimal investment 
standpoint (e.g., Cochrane, 1991, 1996; Chen and Zhang, 2010; Li et al., 2009; Li and Zhang, 2010). The 
basic argument is that firms with low discount rates (expected returns) have high net present values and 
high investment, whereas firms with high discount rates have low net present values and low investment. 
Li and Zhang (2010) show that limits-to-arbitrage dominates q-theory in explaining the asset growth 
anomaly. Watanabe et al. (2013) favour the optimal investment explanation by using global stock markets; 
they find that the asset growth anomaly is stronger in more advanced markets where stocks are more 
efficiently priced. Finally, Lam and Wei (2011) present evidence to support both limits to arbitrage and q-
theory. 
3 
 
asset growth news, it follows that growth firms will be more likely to experience such an 
anomaly, as they should generate more growth news to be extrapolated by investors. 
We therefore develop two hypotheses concerning investor reaction to asset 
growth. First, if overreaction to growth explains the anomaly, then growth firms should 
show a stronger asset growth anomaly than mature firms3. Second, the behavioural bias 
of representativeness suggests that investors overreact more to a series of events, and 
therefore, if overreaction is the explanation, then firms experiencing a longer series of 
high (low) asset growth should experience lower (higher) subsequent returns; thus the 
anomaly would be stronger for firms experiencing a sequence in their growth pattern4. It 
is often argued that investors extrapolate a sequence of same-signed news, which results 
in an overreaction to the information (see, for example, the theoretical model of Barberis 
et al., 1998)5. 
To test the first hypothesis we employ three growth-type proxies: retained 
earnings scaled by firm total assets, the dividend-to-income ratio, and cash flow scaled by 
firm total assets. Growth firms tend to have lower retained earnings, dividends and cash 
flow than mature firms (see Anthony and Ramesh, 1992; DeAngelo et al., 2006; 
Dickinson, 2011). Using US data from 1963 to 2011, we show, by comparing the hedged 
returns of asset growth-sorted portfolios for growth and mature firms, that growth firms 
demonstrate a stronger asset growth anomaly. Sorting on asset growth within growth 
                                                   
 
3 Firm life cycle has been shown to be a useful dimension in understanding the cross-sectional variation of 
corporate finance decisions and accounting ratios. For example, Hirsch and Walz (2011) show that firms in 
different life-cycle patterns make different financing decisions and that these decisions interact with future 
growth and development decisions. Hribar and Yehuda (2015) study the mispricing of accrual and cash 
flow information by the stock market in different firm life-cycle stages.  
4 According to Barberis et al. (1998), after a trend of good or bad information, representativeness causes 
investors to overreact to information and push the price too high. Hong and Stein (1999) argue that 
momentum traders make decisions conditional on past price change; that is, they push stock prices higher 
(lower) when there is an up (down) trend.  
5 Alti and Tetlock (2014) use a structure model approach to study the influence of behavioural biases on 
asset prices. They also identify over-extrapolative belief as the main cause of mispricing.  
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type yields an annualized return difference between growth and mature firms of 20%, 
18% and 13% respectively for the three proxies of growth type – retained earnings, 
dividend-to-income ratio and cash flow. The Fama–MacBeth regression results provide 
further support: for example, they show that the slope of asset growth for growth 
(mature) firms is -0.0124 (-0.0042), when the growth-type proxy is retained earnings. 
To test the second hypothesis, we construct four asset growth sequence 
portfolios each for high- and low-growth firms. For the high-growth sequence portfolios, 
we construct four portfolios of firms that experience asset growth in the top two asset 
growth deciles for one year or consecutively for two, three, or four years respectively. 
The four low-growth sequence portfolios are similarly constructed. We find, by 
comparing the slope of each growth sequence portfolio, that as the asset growth 
sequence increases, the asset growth anomaly becomes stronger. This is especially the 
case for high-growth sequences. In addition to univariate tests, we further examine the 
interaction between growth type and asset growth, and between growth sequence and 
asset growth, after controlling for the two prominent explanations of the asset growth 
anomaly – limits to arbitrage and q-theory with investment frictions. We use five limits-
to-arbitrage proxies (idiosyncratic volatility, bid–ask spread, analyst coverage, analyst 
forecast dispersion, dollar trading volume) and two investment friction proxies (firm age, 
firm total assets). In the majority of cases, the evidence suggests that growth firms and 
longer growth sequences produce a stronger asset growth anomaly. The evidence of 
investor overreaction only to positive sequences, not to negative sequences, provides 
further support to the argument that it is growth, specifically, that investors overreact to. 
In summary, we find evidence to support the overreaction explanation of the 
asset growth anomaly, and our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. 
Complementing Cooper et al. (2008), we provide evidence that a firm’s growth type 
affects the reaction of investors to news of asset growth. More importantly, we also 
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present new evidence to support the suggestion that overreaction is a key driver of the 
asset growth anomaly: we show that both firm growth type and growth sequence are able 
to capture investor overreaction and afford additional explanatory power over the asset 
growth anomaly6. 
The prior literature on mispricing explanations mainly tests whether firms with 
different limits-to-arbitrage levels show different degrees of the asset growth anomaly 
(Lam and Wei, 2011; Watanabe et al., 2013). However, the limits-to-arbitrage approach 
only studies the constraints on correction of the initial mispricing; it does not explicitly 
analyse whether the mispricing is due to over- or underreaction. We contribute to this 
line of literature by studying overreaction as the source of mispricing. 
However, Cooper et al. (2008) do provide some evidence on testing overreaction 
to past earnings: they show that investors are indeed surprised by the subsequent bad 
(good) earnings for high (low) asset growth firms. Although such evidence supports the 
notion that it is expectation errors that cause mispricing (Lakonishok et al., 1994), the 
sources of these errors are not explicitly identified. We show that it is investor 
overreaction to growth opportunities that drives expectation errors and causes the asset 
growth anomaly. 
We contribute to the literature by testing the overreaction to growth in a 
sequential setup. Our unique research design enables us to show that there are elements 
of the asset growth anomaly that can be explained by investor overreaction. The 
explanatory power of the overreaction explanation persists even when we control for 
                                                   
 
6 Hribar and Yehuda (2015) also employ the firm life-cycle concept to study the mispricing of accrual and 
cash flow information by the stock market. They show that both total accruals and free cash flows are 
mispriced to the highest degree in the growth stage. However, the focus of their study was to highlight the 
different information contents of accruals and cash flow in different firm life cycles; there was little 
discussion on the reason for the difference in the strength of the anomaly in different life cycles. 
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limits to arbitrage and q-theory, which means that both firm growth type and growth 
sequence are able to reflect investor overreaction to asset growth information. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the extant 
asset growth anomaly literature and constructs our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
data and variables used in this study. Section 4 presents empirical results for firm growth 
type and the asset growth anomaly, while Section 5 presents results for the asset growth 
sequence portfolios and the representativeness explanation. Section 6 details robustness 
testing and further evidence. Section 7 concludes. 
2.!Related literature and hypothesis development 
In Section 2.1 we review briefly the literatures on mispricing with limits to arbitrage and 
q-theory with investment frictions. In Section 2.2 we develop our two hypotheses 
positing overreaction to growth as an explanation of the asset growth anomaly. 
2.1!Mispricing with limits to arbitrage and q-theory with investment frictions 
Two branches of explanation are proposed in the literature: risk-based (rational) and 
mispricing (behavioural). Regarding the risk-based explanation, upon discovery of the 
asset growth anomaly Cooper et al. (2008) test this explanation and show that standard 
risk factor analysis such as by means of 3-factor models and the conditional CAPM, 
using a standard set of macroeconomic variables, cannot explain the effect. They also 
show that the asset growth effect is not consistent with the implication of the theoretical 
papers that expected returns should systematically decline in response to increasing 
investment. They therefore reject the explanation of time-varying risk induced by 
changes in the mix of firm growth options and assets in place. Overall, Cooper et al. 
(2008) dismiss the rational risk-based explanation of the asset growth anomaly. 
More recent searches for a rational explanation shift the perspective from 
investor to firm. Q-theory suggests that firms invest when the discount rate (expected 
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return) is lower, because a lower discount rate leads to a higher net present value and, 
consequently, a negative investment–return relation is observed (e.g., Cochrane, 1991, 
1996). However, such a prediction is difficult to test empirically since managerial 
expectations of a discount rate are unobservable and it requires the strong assumption of 
market efficiency to make connections between managerial expected discount rates and 
subsequent realized stock returns. As a way forward, Li and Zhang (2010) construct an 
optimal investment model by incorporating investment frictions to q-theory. Firms with 
high investment frictions produce higher investment costs and are therefore not as 
sensitive to changes in the discount rate; that is, only large decreases in the discount rate 
can induce firms with high frictions to invest. If q-theory accounts for the asset growth 
anomaly, it would predict that firms with higher investment frictions will show a stronger 
asset growth anomaly. Q-theory with investment frictions has received some support in 
the literature; for example, Chen and Zhang (2010) develop a 3-factor model based on q-
theory and find supportive evidence. 
A parallel development in the literature is the mispricing explanation of the asset 
growth anomaly. Cooper et al. (2008) argue that the asset growth anomaly reflects 
investor overreaction to firm growth (contraction). They find that firms which grow 
(contract) tend to be firms with future negative (positive) profitability shocks with 
respect to performance in the sorting year. Furthermore, they show that subsequent 
earnings announcements for low-growth firms are associated with positive abnormal 
returns and vice versa. These results are consistent with the La Porta et al. (1997) 
expectation errors mispricing story. 
Further developments in this line of research focus more on the conditions for 
mispricing to persist after it occurs; namely, limits to arbitrage. Both Li and Zhang (2010) 
and Lam and Wei (2011) propose that if mispricing leads to the asset growth anomaly, 
then firms with high limits to arbitrage should exhibit a stronger asset growth anomaly 
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than those with low limits to arbitrage. The reason is that the anomaly cannot be traded 
away quickly and should last for longer periods when there are high limits to arbitrage 
such as high transaction costs, high stock volatility and/or little information about the 
firm. It is important to note that these studies do not directly examine the underlying 
cause of the mispricing. There is an implicit assumption that mispricing occurs in the 
market and arbitrage fails to fully correct it. 
Lipson et al., (2011) find that firms with high transaction costs have a stronger 
asset growth anomaly, which is consistent with the mispricing with limits-to-arbitrage 
explanation. Li and Zhang (2010) and Lam and Wei (2011) compare the explanations of 
mispricing with limits to arbitrage and q-theory with investment frictions. Li and Zhang 
(2010) find that the explanatory power of mispricing with limits to arbitrage is stronger 
than that of q-theory. With a more comprehensive set of proxies for limits to arbitrage 
and investment frictions, Lam and Wei (2011) show that the two explanations have 
similar explanatory power in terms of the asset growth anomaly; they also consider the 
high correlation between the limits-to-arbitrage and investment friction proxies as a key 
issue in trying to distinguish between the two explanations. More recently, in an attempt 
to address this issue, Titman et al. (2013) and Watanabe et al. (2013) undertake cross-
country studies and find a stronger asset growth anomaly in more developed stock 
markets than less developed markets, which is consistent with dynamically optimal 
investment; that is, they find support for q-theory. 
In summary, while the literature demonstrates support for both q-theory with 
investment frictions and mispricing with limits to arbitrage to explain the asset growth 
anomaly, recent studies have leaned more towards the q-theory explanation. Mispricing 
as an explanation of the phenomenon has received less attention since Cooper et al.’s 
(2008) early analysis. Importantly, recent studies on the mispricing explanation only focus 
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on the conditions for the subsequent persistence of mispricing rather than the cause of 
the initial pricing. Our study aims to fill this void. 
2.2!Testable hypotheses 
In this study, we investigate how investors react to firm growth information and examine 
how far any overreaction can be related to the representativeness heuristic. 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) claim that investors extrapolate firm performance too far 
into the future and therefore push the price too high or low, causing a subsequent 
reversal. Their argument implies that investors overreact to a firm’s prospects. In 
essence, investors display unrealistic views about a firm’s prospects and are unable to 
forecast (e.g., Weinstein, 1980; Buehler et al., 1994). 
Growth firms are usually characterized as relatively young and small, and have 
less information available but more growth opportunities or better growth prospects. In 
contrast, mature firms are characterized as having long histories, large size and more 
information available but less growth opportunity. Therefore, investors should overreact 
more to growth firms because of their greater growth opportunities in comparison to 
mature firms. These arguments lead to our first hypothesis. 
H1. Growth firms should exhibit a stronger asset growth anomaly (negative relation between asset 
growth and stock returns) than mature firms, because of overreaction to greater growth opportunities. 
Barberis et al. (1998) argue that investors tend to confirm the sequence when they witness 
one asset growth surprise followed by another. This is consistent with 
representativeness7, and implies that the longer the asset growth sequence, the stronger 
the asset growth anomaly. Specifically, when investors see a consecutive high asset 
growth series, they believe that the sequence will continue and they push the price to a 
                                                   
 
7  Tversky and Kahneman (1974) show representativeness as a behavioural heuristic; that is, people 
determine probability by using a sample that they think reflects the distribution of the population. Such a 
process results in the bias of over-generalizing recent observations.  
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high level – and to an even higher level when the series is longer. Afterwards, when 
investors recognize the reality and correct their valuation, the stock prices reverse. As a 
result, a negative relation between asset growth and subsequent returns should be 
observed8. If this is the case, the findings will tend to support overreaction as the 
explanation of the asset growth anomaly; furthermore, the representativeness heuristic 
will be the underlying driver of this overreaction. Hence, we develop our second 
hypothesis. 
H2. Firms with longer asset growth sequences should exhibit a stronger asset growth anomaly (negative 
relation between asset growth and stock returns), ceteris paribus, than firms with shorter asset growth 
sequences, because of the representativeness bias. 
3.!Data and variables 
3.1!Sample selection 
We use US data including NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq from 1963 to 2011 based on the 
CRSP and Compustat datasets. Monthly stock returns are from CRSP and yearly 
financial reporting variables are from Compustat. We exclude financial firms with 4-digit 
SIC codes between 6000 and 69999. For analyst data, that is, the number of analysts 
covering a firm and the dispersion in analyst forecasts, we start from 1977 due to the 
availability of data. To avoid the problems of survivorship or selection bias, we follow 
Fama and French (1993) and Cooper et al. (2008) in retaining only those firms with at 
                                                   
 
8 In general, overreaction is defined as investors overreacting to past asset growth information. This works 
in both high- and low-growth firms. In other words, when investors observe a series of high (low) growth 
they will extrapolate and expect continued high (low) growth in the future. When this error is corrected, we 
observer a reversal in returns for both high- and low-growth firms.  
9 Fama and French (2008), Cooper et al. (2008) and Lam and Wei (2011) do not include financial firms in 
their` sample when investigating the asset growth anomaly.  
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least two years of Compustat data10. There remain 172,732 firm–year observations after 
following the above sample selection procedure. For some portfolio formations, we 
require four years of data availability prior to the formation date. For our Fama–MacBeth 
regressions, we update returns monthly and asset growth or other financial variables on a 
yearly basis. 
3.2!Asset growth measurement 
Following Cooper et al. (2008) we use the percentage change of a firm’s assets between 
the current and previous year as the measure of firm asset growth (AG). That is, 
AG = TAt-1/TAt-2!-!1. Lipson et al. (2011) compare different definitions of asset growth 
and show that there is little effect on the asset growth anomaly. (The construction of 
asset growth and the following proxies are detailed in the appendix.) 
3.3!Proxies of growth type 
We use three measures to proxy the growth stage of a firm: retained earnings scaled by 
total assets (RE), dividends scaled by income (DIV) and cash flow scaled by total assets 
(CF). 
The first growth-type proxy is retained earnings scaled by total assets (RE). 
DeAngelo et al. (2006) show evidence that retained earnings as a proportion of total 
assets is a good proxy of growth type – that is, firms with high RE are in the maturity 
stage while firms with low RE are more likely to be growth firms. They also find a strong 
positive relation between RE and dividends: specifically, high-RE firms have more 
motivation to distribute dividends because they have less investment opportunity and 
enough capacity to self-finance; in contrast, low-RE firms are not likely to be dividend 
                                                   
 
10 Banz and Breen (1986) and Lam and Wei (2011) also set this requirement when selecting their samples, 
in order to minimize the selection bias. 
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payers because they face abundant investment opportunities. This leads to our second 
proxy. 
The second growth-type proxy is dividends scaled by income (DIV), which is 
used in previous literature (e.g., Anthony and Ramesh, 1992; Bulan et al., 2007). 
Following Anthony and Ramesh (1992), we classify high-DIV firms as mature firms and 
low-DIV firms as growth firms. DeAngelo et al. (2010) show that these dividend groups 
are reasonable proxies for life-cycle stage. 
The third growth-type proxy is cash flow scaled by total assets (CF). Growth 
firms have a large investment opportunity set and invest more than the cash they can 
generate, so they are characterized by low cash flows (e.g., Dickinson, 2011). In contrast, 
mature firms have the ability to generate high cash flows. 
3.4!Proxies of investment frictions 
We use two proxies for investment frictions. The first is firm age (AGE). Younger firms 
have less information available in the market because they have shorter histories (e.g., 
Barry and Brown, 1985; Zhang, 2006). Without sufficient information, younger firms 
face greater financing constraints. 
The other proxy for investment frictions is firm size measured by total assets 
(TA). The market usually has less information about small firms, which are not attractive 
to investors and so lack attention. Both Li and Zhang (2010) and Lam and Wei (2011) 
also use asset size as a proxy for investment frictions. 
3.5!Proxies of limits to arbitrage 
We use five proxies for limits to arbitrage: idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), bid–ask spread 
(BAS), analyst coverage (COV), analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) and dollar trading 
volume (DVOL). 
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The first proxy of limits to arbitrage is idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL). Unlike 
total return volatility, idiosyncratic volatility measures the firm-specific or unsystematic 
arbitrage risk in terms of firm-specific information (e.g., Pontiff, 1996; Wurgler and 
Zhuravskaya, 2002; Ali et al., 2003). 
The second proxy of limits to arbitrage is the bid–ask spread (BAS), with a larger 
bid–ask spread suggesting higher transaction costs (e.g., Lam and Wei, 2011). These 
would set constraints on arbitrage behaviour, and therefore a larger bid–ask spread 
means higher limits to arbitrage. 
The third proxy of limits to arbitrage, analyst coverage (COV), measures the 
number of financial analysts covering the firm, on the assumption that the greater the 
number of analysts, the more the investors will be able to access information about the 
firm, and so make more reliable decisions. Hong et al. (2000) argue that lower analyst 
coverage means higher information uncertainty. Lam and Wei (2011) find that the asset 
growth anomaly is stronger for firms with high limits-to-arbitrage, and they too use 
analyst coverage as a limits-to-arbitrage proxy.  
The fourth proxy of limits to arbitrage, analyst forecast dispersion (DISP), 
reflects the disagreement in analyst forecasts. The extent of dispersion is positively 
related to information uncertainty (e.g., Barron and Stuerke, 1998; Diether et al. 2002; 
Zhang, 2006); thus a greater dispersion implies greater risk. 
The fifth proxy of limits to arbitrage is dollar trading volume (DVOL), with a 
higher dollar trading volume indicating more activity in a stock; that is, a higher trading 
volume implies lower limits to arbitrage (e.g., Lam and Wei, 2011). 
3.6!Sample summary statistics 
Table 1 presents the sample summary statistics. Panel A reports the means of firm 
characteristics. Growth firms can be characterized as younger firms with low total assets, 
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while mature firms have larger total assets and a long history. Growth firms are shown 
generally to have larger bid–ask spreads, greater analyst forecast dispersion and higher 
idiosyncratic volatility than mature firms, but fewer analysts and lower dollar trading 
volumes. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Panel B in Table 1 reports the correlations across the limits-to-arbitrage and 
investment friction proxies. As idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), bid–ask spread (BAS), 
analyst coverage (COV), analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) and dollar trading volume 
(DVOL) all reflect the level of limits to arbitrage, these proxies are highly correlated; for 
example, dollar trading volume (DVOL) has a Pearson (Spearman) correlation of 
-51.3% (-75.0%) with bid–ask spread (BAS) and of 60.7% (77.7%) with analyst 
coverage (COV). Similarly, the firm total assets (TA) and firm age (AGE) proxies are 
correlated because both relate to investment frictions: the relevant Pearson and 
Spearman correlations are 42.0% and 37.0%. Further, the limits-to-arbitrage proxies 
(IVOL, BAS, COV, DISP and DVOL) and investment friction proxies (AGE and TA) 
are correlated. For Pearson correlations (below the diagonal), firm age (AGE) and dollar 
trading volume (DVOL) have a correlation of 27.8%; correlations between firm total 
assets (TA) and idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), bid–ask spread (BAS), analyst coverage 
(COV) and dollar trading volume (DVOL) are -42.7%, -46.0%, 40.7% and 73.4% 
respectively. Above the diagonal are the Spearman rank-order correlations and they show 
a similar but even higher set of correlations in most cases between the proxies of limits 
to arbitrage and those of investment frictions. 
Given the level of these correlations, it is difficult to ascertain whether limits to 
arbitrage or investment frictions might best explain the asset growth anomaly. Lam and 
Wei (2011) show that neither explanation dominates; Watanabe et al. (2013) argue that 
due to the high correlation between proxies of limits-to-arbitrage and investment 
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frictions, they not surprisingly produce similar predictions. Our analysis using a growth 
and mature firm typology seems to capture key cross-sectional variations in the 
investment friction and limits-to-arbitrage measures. It is therefore important to examine 
whether or not investors react differently to growth and mature firms after controlling 
for these factors. 
4.!Growth type and the asset growth anomaly 
Two methodologies are used to examine whether or not growth firms show a stronger 
asset growth anomaly: sorts of returns according to asset growth, and Fama–MacBeth 
regressions on the interaction effect of growth type and asset growth11. Sorts of returns 
are used to uncover the basic pattern of comparison of the asset growth effect between 
growth firms and mature firms. The interaction effect regressions, controlling for limits 
to arbitrage and investment frictions, are used to demonstrate the unique information 
contained in growth type. 
4.1!Sorting 
We first divide firms into two categories – growth and mature – based on the three 
growth-type proxies: retained earnings scaled by total assets (RE), dividends scaled by 
income (DIV) and cash flow scaled by total assets (CF). Specifically, we rank firms in 
deciles based on each of the growth-type proxies; the bottom three deciles are defined as 
belonging to the growth group, and the top three deciles to the mature group. Following 
Fama and French (2008) and Lam and Wei (2011), within mature and growth firms we 
further sort firms into deciles based on asset growth in year t-1 and calculate average 
monthly returns from July in year t to June in year t+1 for each asset growth decile. 
                                                   
 
11 Fama and French (2008) argue that sorts can capture stock return patterns based on an anomaly variable 
but that they cannot show the marginal effect and the unique information of an anomaly variable. 
Regression is one solution, of sorts, to this shortcoming.  
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Table 2 reports the monthly raw returns and Fama–French alphas for growth and 
mature firms for both equal- and value-weighted portfolios. Panel A presents equal-
weighted raw returns for each growth-type proxy, showing that future monthly returns 
decrease as asset growth increases for both growth and mature firms. The differences in 
returns between low and high asset growth stocks are significantly positive (with t-
statistics corrected by the Newey–West (1987) method). These initial results show that 
both growth and mature firms display the asset growth effect, confirming that this 
anomaly exists for the US market. Further, the spreads of hedged returns between 
growth and mature firms are reported in the rows ‘Spread (G!-!M)’, and are 1.5%, 1.0% 
and 1.3% respectively for the three growth-type proxies – retained earnings (RE), 
dividends (DIV) and cash flow (CF). All three spreads are significant at the 1% level and 
indicate that growth firms have a stronger asset growth anomaly. 
When firm size is taken into consideration through value-weighted portfolio 
construction, Panel B shows further support for the finding that the asset growth 
anomaly is much stronger in growth firms than in mature firms. Specifically, the asset 
growth anomaly is not a significant phenomenon in the mature firm, while there is a 
significant anomaly shown in two out of the three growth-type proxies for growth firms. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn when the Fama–French regression alphas are 
considered in Panels C and D. Overall, the sorting analysis demonstrates that the asset 
growth anomaly is stronger in growth firms. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4.2!Regression 
The above univariate analyses show a stronger asset growth effect for growth firms. In 
this subsection we examine the marginal effect of growth type on the asset growth 
anomaly and whether the growth type holds additional information concerning the asset 
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growth anomaly after controlling for limits to arbitrage and investment frictions. As in 
Section 4.1, we group firms into deciles based on each of the three growth-type proxies. 
Then we assign -1 to mature firms, 1 to growth firms and 0 to the rest. We run a Fama–
MacBeth regression with an interaction term between growth type and asset growth to 
capture how growth type affects the slope of asset growth. In each month, we first run 
the following cross-sectional regression from 1963 to 2011: 
!"#$ = & + ()*	(1 + ./)$ +1)*	(1 + ./)$ × /3 + 4/3 + ∑ 6789*#:9)$7;7<= + >, 
Eq. (1) 
where Ret is the monthly return updated monthly; AG is asset growth updated annually; 
and GT indicates growth type, with values assigned as above. Control variables are the 
natural logarithm of book-to-market ratio (lnBM), the natural logarithm of market value 
(lnMV), and the previous 6-month returns (PRE6RET), which are widely used 
predictors of cross-sectional returns. 
Table 3 summarizes the regression results. For all three growth-type proxies, the 
slope of the interaction term between growth type and asset growth is significant and 
negative. These results support our first hypothesis that the asset growth anomaly is 
much stronger for growth firms. Interestingly, the non-interactive asset growth 
coefficient for the RE regression is insignificant, which suggests that after controlling for 
growth type proxied by RE, the original asset growth anomaly has disappeared. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We next examine whether growth type is subsumed by the limits-to-arbitrage and 
investment friction explanations. As noted in the discussion of correlations in Section 
3.6, proxies are correlated within and between the limits-to-arbitrage and investment 
frictions groups. To address this multicollinearity issue, following Watanabe et al. (2013) 
we control for limits-to-arbitrage and investment friction proxies separately. We run 
regressions from 1963 to 2011 but for some proxies the regressions start, of necessity, 
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from when the data are available. For example, analyst data are available from 1997; 
hence we run regressions from 1997 when we control for analyst coverage and analyst 
forecast dispersion. In each month, we run the following cross-sectional regression: 
!"#$ = & + ( ln(1 + ./)$ +1 ln(1 + ./)$ × /3 + 4/3 + A ln(1 + ./)$×BCD:9EF	
+ GBCD:9EH	 +I6789*#:9)$7
;
7<=
+ >, 
Eq. (2) 
where LIproxy is a proxy of either limits to arbitrage or investment frictions. 
Table 4 presents the slope of the interaction between asset growth and growth 
type. Panels A to C show the results for each of the three growth-type proxies – RE, 
DIV and CF. In each panel we control for the five limits-to-arbitrage proxies and the 
two investment friction proxies, giving us 21 regressions in total across the three panels. 
The results for growth-type proxy RE (Panel A) show that six out of seven regressions 
have significantly negative coefficients for the interaction between growth type and asset 
growth. This suggests that the results for growth type proxied by RE are robust to 
controls on most of the existing explanations. The results for growth-type proxy DIV 
(Panel B) show similar though weaker findings, with four out of the seven regressions 
displaying significantly negative coefficients for the interaction between growth type and 
asset growth. Finally, the results for growth-type proxy CF (Panel C) show that its effects 
are robust to the control of only one limits-to-arbitrage (Model 1) and one investment 
friction (Model 7) proxy. This is partly as expected, since firms with lower cash flow are 
likely to have higher investment frictions. On balance, these sets of regression results 
show that the growth type of a firm does have some additional information in explaining 
the relationship between asset growth and stock returns after controlling for limits-to-
arbitrage and investment frictions. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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5.!Asset growth sequence and the asset growth anomaly 
5.1!Univariate analysis 
The above results show that growth firms have a stronger asset growth anomaly, a 
finding that gives support to the overreaction explanation. Further, if the asset growth 
anomaly is indeed driven by overreaction, we would expect the sequence of asset growth 
to affect the asset growth anomaly. More specifically, we will argue that investors 
overreact to firm asset growth when they see a growth sequence, and that, as the 
sequence becomes longer, investors overreact more. 
To construct asset growth sequence portfolios we first sort firms into deciles in 
the June of each year, based on asset growth; the top and bottom two asset growth 
deciles in each year are defined as the high and low asset growth groups respectively. We 
then look back to find which asset growth decile the firm is allocated to in the previous 
year and more. H1 denotes the portfolio, at formation date, of firms in the high asset 
growth group in June of both year t and the previous year t-1 (but not in that of year 
t-2). Hi denotes the portfolio of firms remaining in the high asset growth group over the 
previous i consecutive years (where i = 2, 3, or 4). We repeat this procedure for the low 
asset growth sequence groups, L1 to L4. 
To ascertain whether returns decrease (increase) with a longer high (low) asset 
growth sequence, we show equal-weighted average monthly returns for each growth 
sequence portfolio. Further, we examine the slope of the asset growth regression in each 
portfolio to investigate whether the asset growth anomaly is stronger with an increase in 
the asset growth sequence. 
Panel A in Table 5 shows the return pattern of the growth sequence portfolios. 
For the high asset growth sequences, the equal-weighted returns reported in the H 
column are decreasing monotonically from H1 to H4, from 0.86% to 0.36%. The 
20 
 
difference between H4 and H1 is significantly negative, indicating that firms with a 
longer sequence of high asset growth have lower returns in the near future. For the low 
asset growth sequences, L, the equal-weighted returns do not show a monotonic pattern 
of returns increasing with a longer asset growth sequence; nevertheless, the significantly 
positive return difference between L4 and L1 confirms our expectation (for low growth 
firms, those firms with longer sequence earn higher returns). When we consider the 
hedged return in each sequence group, the returns of L!-!H are all positive and 
significant, which confirms the asset growth effect in all groupings. Furthermore, this 
hedged return increases monotonically from Sequences 1 to 4 and the difference between 
the longest and shortest sequence is statistically significant. Economically, investing in 
the hedged portfolio of the longest growth sequence will have more than double the 
return (1.73%) of the shortest growth sequence (0.83%). Overall, the evidence is 
consistent with investors behaving according to the representativeness heuristic; that is, 
returns diminish with more consecutive years of high asset growth and increase with 
more consecutive years of low asset growth. 
In a further test, we directly analyse whether the asset growth anomaly increases 
as the asset growth sequence increases by using regression on asset growth. Within each 
growth sequence portfolio, we employ a Fama–MacBeth regression that controls for the 
natural logarithm of market value, the natural logarithm of book-to-market ratio, and the 
previous 6-month returns. The slope coefficients are reported in Panel B of Table 5. For 
the high asset growth sequences, three out of four coefficients are significantly negative, 
confirming the asset growth effect. The slope difference between H1 and H4 is -6.76 and 
significant at the 10% level; suggesting that firms with a longer asset growth sequence 
show a stronger asset growth anomaly. In contrast, for the low asset growth sequences 
there is only very weak evidence of the asset growth anomaly, and the slope difference 
between L1 and L4 is not significant. The asymmetric pattern suggests that the asset 
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growth anomaly is mainly driven by an overreaction to high asset growth. This further 
confirms that the asset growth anomaly is more likely to be caused by investors’ appetite 
for growth (the high-growth sequence) rather than contraction (the low-growth 
sequence). The asset growth slope coefficients for portfolios including both high- and 
low-growth firms in each sequence further support our second hypothesis that the asset 
growth anomaly is stronger for firms with a longer sequence of asset growth. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
5.2!Multiple regression 
In this subsection, we test whether the sequence of asset growth continues to influence 
the asset growth anomaly after controlling for limits-to-arbitrage and investment friction 
proxies. We perform Fama–MacBeth regressions of monthly returns on asset growth, 
interacting with the asset growth sequence, limits-to-arbitrage proxies, investment 
friction proxies, book-to-market ratio, market value and previous 6-month returns. 
Given the correlation within and between the limits-to-arbitrage and investment friction 
proxies, following the procedure in Section 4.2 we include them in separate regressions. 
In each month, we run the following cross-sectional regression: 
!"#$ = & + ( ln(1 + ./)$ +1= ln(1 + ./)$ × KFLℎ	N"OP"*Q" + 1R ln(1 + ./)$ ×
B9S	N"OP"*Q" + 4=KFLℎ	N"OP"*Q" + 4RB9S	N"OP"*Q" + A)*	(1 + ./)$×BCD:9EH +
GBCD:9EH	 + ∑ 6789*#:9)$7;7<= + > , 
Eq. (3) 
where Ret is the monthly return updating monthly; AG is asset growth updating annually; 
High (Low) sequence is the length of the sequence; and LIproxy is a proxy from either the 
limits-to-arbitrage or the investment friction group. Control variables are the natural 
logarithm of book-to-market ratio (lnBM), the natural logarithm of market value (lnMV), 
and the previous 6-month returns (PRE6RET) which are widely used predictors of 
cross-sectional returns. 
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Table 6 reports the slope of interaction between asset growth sequence and asset 
growth. Model 1 has no limits-to-arbitrage or investment friction proxies; in Models 2 to 
6 we control for limits-to-arbitrage proxies and in Models 7 to 8 for investment friction 
proxies. The slope of interaction between the high asset growth sequence and asset 
growth is significantly negative, with Models 2 to 8 showing a significantly negative slope 
for the interaction term except when controlling for idiosyncratic volatility, analyst 
forecast dispersion and firm age. To summarize, these results broadly support the 
prediction that the asset growth anomaly will be stronger when the asset growth 
sequence is longer. They therefore give weight to the argument that overreaction is the 
mechanism that drives the asset growth anomaly and representativeness is the heuristic 
that strengthens the relationship. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
6.!Robustness testing and further evidence 
6.1!Past growth effect 
Cooper et al. (2008) show that asset growth can affect future returns beyond the first 
year. Our analyses, in the previous section, showing a stronger asset growth effect 
following a longer sequence of high or low growth, could potentially capture any 
spillover effect of previous growth. To resolve this concern, we rerun our analysis 
including the previous three periods of asset growth as a control for each asset growth 
sequence regression. Table 7 reports the results, showing that the asset growth slope 
coefficients in general increase as growth sequence increases, which is consistent with the 
findings in Table 5, Panel B. In particular, after controlling for the effect of past asset 
growth, these results show that investor overreaction increases with the length of growth 
sequence only after more than one consecutive growth years (from sequence 2 to 4) have 
been observed. Overall, our findings are thus robust to the control of past growth. 
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[Insert Table 7 about here] 
6.2!Further evidence on overreaction 
So far, our test for the overreaction explanation follows the traditional setup by studying 
the return reversal pattern after growth. If investor overreaction to asset growth is in fact 
an explanation for the anomaly, evidence of price overreaction to growth information 
would be expected during the formation period. We study this possibility by running 
regression analyses of contemporary returns on asset growth and further interactions 
with growth type and growth sequence.12 Table 8 reports the regression results from a 
setup similar to those used to study the asset growth effect as shown in Tables 3 and 7, 
for growth type and growth sequence respectively. The only difference is that the 
dependent variable in Table 8 is returns during the formation period rather than 
subsequent returns. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Panel A in Table 8 shows the asset growth slope coefficients as significant and 
positive, that is, opposite in sign to the regressions using future returns as shown in 
Table 3. This confirms that the subsequent reversal effect is indeed driven by price 
movement conditional on asset growth during the formation period. Furthermore, 
supporting our first hypothesis, growth type demonstrates additional explanatory power 
over investor overreaction to growth. The interaction terms of asset growth and growth-
type proxy, for two out of the three (DIV and CF), are significant and positive, 
suggesting that investors react more per unit of asset growth in growth firms. Panel B 
then provides consistent evidence for the growth sequence effect, showing that investors 
react more per unit of asset growth as the growth sequence increases. 
                                                   
 
12 We thank the referee for suggesting the possibility of providing further evidence of overreaction through 
studying price movement during the formation period.  
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Overall, the findings in Table 8 provide additional confirmation that the asset 
growth effect is indeed driven by investor overreaction to growth information during the 
formation period. Although the life-cycle proxies may potentially correlate with the 
proxies of investment frictions (used for testing the q-theory explanation), the evidence 
of price movement during the formation period confirms that the moderation effect of 
growth type does in fact capture the variation in investor overreaction to growth. This 
provides further evidence to differentiate our account from the q-theory explanations. 
7.!Conclusion 
This paper extends the search for an explanation of the asset growth anomaly. Previous 
studies find evidence that firms with higher limits-to-arbitrage and high investment 
frictions show a stronger asset growth anomaly. In the current study, we show that 
growth firms demonstrate a stronger asset growth anomaly than mature firms and that 
this result is robust to both sorting and regression methodologies. Furthermore, we show 
that the firm growth phase provides additional information beyond limits to arbitrage 
and investment frictions in terms of explaining the asset growth anomaly. 
We then show that the way investors react to firm asset growth is consistent with 
overreaction underpinned by representativeness. When investors see a series of asset 
growth surprises, they tend to overreact to firm asset growth, and they overreact more 
when the length of the sequence increases. Hence, the evidence presented here further 
supports overreaction as the potential source of the asset growth anomaly, based on the 
representativeness heuristic in relation to asset growth sequence. 
In summary, we show that growth firms have a greater tendency to display the 
asset growth anomaly over and above limits to arbitrage and investment frictions, and 
that, furthermore, this effect seems to be explained by investor overreaction underpinned 
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by the representativeness heuristic. This evidence complements and extends the initial 
analysis of the mispricing hypothesis by Cooper et al. (2008). 
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Appendix. Definition of variables 
Asset growth (AG) is calculated by the equation: AGt = TAt-1/TAt-2  - 1. 
Control variables 
Book-to-market ratio (BM) is the book value of assets in year t-1 divided by market 
value at the end of year t-1. Book value is total assets minus liabilities, 
plusbalance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credits, minus preferred 
stock liquidation value if available, or redemption value if available, or carrying 
value if available (e.g., Fama and French, 1993). 
Market value (MV) is the market capitalization at the end of June in year t, measured in 
millions of dollars. Market capitalization is price multiplied by outstanding shares. 
Previous 6-month returns (PRE6RET) is the past 6-month compounding returns 
ending at the end of June in year t. 
Growth-type proxies 
Retained earnings (RE) is the retained earnings in the previous fiscal year divided by 
total assets in the previous fiscal year. 
Dividend (DIV) is the total dividend, if available, divided by income, before 
extraordinary items, in the previous fiscal year. 
Cash flow (CF) is cash flow scaled by total assets in the previous fiscal year. Cash flow 
is operating income after depreciation minus accruals. Accruals are the change of 
non-cash current assets minus the change of current liabilities and depreciation. 
Limits-to-arbitrage proxies 
Idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) is the standard deviation of the residual from the 
regression of stock return on the market return over the past 12 months ending 
at the end of June in year t. (A 36-month history is required to estimate the 
regression, or a minimum of 24 months if 36 months of data is not available.) 
Bid–ask spread (BAS) is the time series average of 2 × UD:FQ" − (WXYZ[$\)R U /D:FQ" 
over the past 12 months, ending at the end of June in year t (e.g., Lam and Wei, 
2011). 
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Analyst coverage (COV) is the number of analysts following the firm at the end of 
June in each year. 
Analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts for 
earnings per share at the end of June in year t, scaled by stock price at the end of 
June in year t-1. 
Dollar trading volume (DVOL) is the time series average of the past 12-month dollar 
trading volume that is the closing price multiplied by monthly traded shares 
ending at the end of June in year t, measured in millions of dollars. (If there is no 
12-month information, a minimum of 6 months of data are required.) 
Investment friction proxies 
Firm age (AGE) is the number of years a stock has appeared in the CRSP database as at 
the end of June in year t. 
Firm total assets (TA) is the book value of total assets in the previous fiscal year. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Panel A of this table reports the means of firm characteristics. Firms are sorted into deciles based on the three growth-type proxies – retained earnings scaled by 
total assets (RE), dividends scaled by income before extraordinary items (DIV) and cash flow scaled by total assets (CF). The top and bottom three deciles are 
defined as mature and growth firms respectively, for RE, DIV and CF. Differences between growth and mature firms are reported, with t-statistics. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Panel B reports Pearson correlations below the diagonal and Spearman rank-order correlations 
above the diagonal for limits-to-arbitrage and investment friction proxies. The definitions of these proxies are given in the appendix. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
RE 
 
DIV 
 
CF 
 
Growth Mature Diff(G-M) t(G-M) 
 
Growth Mature Diff(G-M) t(G-M) 
 
Growth Mature Diff(G-M) t(G-M) 
IVOL 0.21 0.10 0.10*** 174.33  0.17 0.09 0.08*** 158.06  0.20 0.09 0.11*** 187.44 
BAS 0.04 0.02 0.02*** 73.71 
 
0.03 0.01 0.02*** 64.94 
 
0.04 0.01 0.03*** 95.09 
COV 80.74 100.68 –19.94*** –11.04 
 
68.47 95.47 –27.00*** –11.18 
 
67.51 126.75 –59.24*** –30.27 
DISP 105.90 23.09 82.77** 2.53 
 
155.70 34.23 121.43*** 2.60 
 
84.46 39.73 44.74 1.48 
DVOL 0.48 3.19 –2.71*** –27.83 
 
0.81 3.15 –2.34*** –18.90 
 
0.48 4.94 –4.46*** –38.65 
AGE 7.83 14.95 –7.12*** 126.28  8.55 15.96 –7.42*** –95.23  7.82 15.42 –7.59*** 125.50 
TA 287 2109 –1822*** –42.30  920 4519 –3599*** –21.28  188 4423 –4234*** –69.49 
Panel B: Correlations 
 
IVOL BAS COV DISP DVOL AGE TA 
IVOL 1 0.479 –0.084 0.190 –0.233 –0.309 –0.513 
BAS 0.340 1 –0.725 –0.441 –0.750 –0.302 –0.711 
COV –0.094 –0.326 1 0.633 0.777 0.187 0.521 
DISP 0.009 0.011 0.010 1 0.462 0.055 0.296 
DVOL –0.189 –0.513 0.607 0.006 1 0.193 0.730 
AGE 
–0.243 
 
–0.188 0.199 0.003 0.278 1 0.370 
TA –0.427 –0.460 0.407 0.006 0.734 0.420 1 
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Table 2. Asset growth effect in growth and mature firms 
This table reports the average monthly raw returns and Fama–French alphas (both in %) for each asset growth group over one year for both growth and mature 
firms. Firms are sorted into deciles based on the three growth-type proxies – retained earnings scaled by total assets (RE), dividends scaled by income before 
extraordinary items (DIV) and cash flow scaled by total assets (CF); the top and bottom three deciles are defined as mature and growth firms respectively, for RE, 
DIV and CF. Within mature and growth firms, firms are further sorted into deciles based on asset growth rate; the top (bottom) two deciles are defined as high 
(low) asset growth. For each asset growth decile, stocks are held for one year from July in year t to June in year t+1. The table reports average returns or alphas over 
the period, and the spread is the difference between the low and high asset growth groups. The table also reports the average of the hedged difference between 
growth and mature firms for each growth-type proxy; hedged returns are calculated as the return of the low asset growth group minus that of the high asset growth 
group. Panel A reports equal-weighted portfolio average monthly raw returns. Panel B reports value-weighted portfolio average monthly raw returns. Panel C 
reports equal-weighted portfolio Fama–French monthly alphas. Panel D reports value-weighted portfolio Fama–French monthly alphas. The sample period is from 
1963 to 2011. t-values are based on Newey–West (1987) standard errors, correcting for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 2. Continued 
Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio average monthly raw returns 
Proxy Growth type 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
Diff 
(1-10) 
t 
Firm–
year obs 
RE Mature 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.6*** 3.89 59855 
 Growth 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.0 2.0*** 7.69 59852 
 
Spread (G-M) 
          
1.5*** 5.78  
DIV Mature 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.7*** 5.06 25272 
 Growth 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.8 1.0*** 5.82 25267 
 
Spread (G-M) 
          
1.0*** 3.06  
CF Mature 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.8*** 4.94 57967 
 Growth 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.4 –0.1 2.1*** 7.95 57963 
  Spread (G-M) 
          
1.3*** 5.11  
Panel B: Value-weighted portfolio average monthly raw returns 
Proxy Growth type 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
Diff 
(1-10) 
t 
RE Mature 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.8 –0.1 –0.27 
 
Growth 4.3 3.5 3.4 2.9 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.5 1.9*** 5.01 
 
Spread (G-M) 
          
1.9*** 5.13 
DIV Mature 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.2 0.3 1.51 
 
Growth 2.3 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.9 1.6 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.9 0.4 1.56 
 
Spread (G-M) 
          
0.1 0.39 
CF Mature 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 0.3 1.55 
 
Growth 4.2 3.8 3.7 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.6 2.5 1.7*** 4.22 
 
Spread (G-M) 
          
1.3*** 3.40 
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Table 2. Continued 
Panel C: Equal-weighted portfolio Fama–French monthly alphas 
Proxy Growth type 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
Diff 
(1-10) 
t 
RE Mature 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4** 2.11 
 
Growth 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.0 –0.6 –0.4 –1.1 1.8*** 5.74 
 
Spread (G-M) 
          
1.4*** 4.03 
DIV Mature 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 –0.1 0.5*** 3.04 
 
Growth 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.0 –0.4 1.1*** 5.66 
 
Spread (G-M) 
          
0.6** 2.47 
CF Mature 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.5*** 2.81 
 
Growth 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.0 –0.5 –0.6 –1.0 1.6*** 4.67 
 
Spread (G-M) 
          
1.1*** 3.86 
Panel D: Value-weighted portfolio Fama–French monthly alphas 
Proxy Growth type 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High) 
Diff 
(1-10) 
t 
RE Mature 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.2 –0.2 –0.77 
 
Growth 3.0 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6*** 3.45 
 
Spread (G-M) 
          
1.8*** 3.71 
DIV Mature 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.3 1.12 
 
Growth 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.4 0.7 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.5* 1.88 
 
Spread (G-M) 
          
0.2 0.60 
CF Mature 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.43 
 
Growth 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.1 1.8 1.9 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.2*** 2.91 
 
Spread (G-M) 
          
1.2*** 2.86 
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Table 3. Growth type and the asset growth anomaly 
This table reports the time-series average of the estimated coefficients of monthly regressions 
from 1963 to 2011. In each month we run the following regression: 
!"#$ = & + ()*	(1 + ./)$ +1)*	(1 + ./)$ × /3 + 4/3 + ∑ 6789*#:9)$7;7<= + >,  
Eq. (1) 
where Reti is the monthly raw return; AG is firm asset growth; GT indicates firm growth type (1 
for growth, -1 for mature and 0 for the rest). Firms are sorted into deciles based on the three 
growth-type proxies – retained earnings scaled by total assets (RE), dividends scaled by income 
before extraordinary items (DIV) and cash flow scaled by total assets (CF); the top and bottom 
three deciles are defined as mature and growth firms respectively, for RE, DIV and CF. Control 
variables are the natural logarithm of book-to-market ratio (lnBM), the natural logarithm of 
market value (lnMV), and the previous 6-month returns at the end of June (PRE6RET). t-values 
in parentheses are based on Newey–West (1987) standard errors, correcting for heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
  RE 
 
DIV 
 
CF 
Intercept 2.07*** 
 
1.60*** 
 
2.49*** 
 
(6.80) 
 
(6.30) 
 
(7.47) 
ln(1+AG) –0.21 
 
–0.66*** 
 
–0.59*** 
 
(–0.78) 
 
(–2.79) 
 
(–2.98) 
ln(1+AG)*GT –1.12*** 
 
–0.78** 
 
–0.94*** 
 
(–3.53) 
 
(–2.52) 
 
(–3.46) 
GT –0.07 
 
0.23** 
 
–0.34** 
 
(–0.49) 
 
(2.33) 
 
(–2.16) 
lnBM 0.18*** 
 
0.07* 
 
0.08** 
 
(3.90) 
 
(1.82) 
 
(1.97) 
lnMV –0.14*** 
 
–0.09*** 
 
–0.19*** 
 
(–3.79) 
 
(–2.74) 
 
(–5.47) 
PRE6RET 0.16 
 
0.63*** 
 
0.26 
  (0.87)   (3.11)   (1.50) 
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Table 4. Growth type, limits-to-arbitrage, investment frictions and the asset growth 
anomaly 
This table reports the time-series average of the estimated coefficients of monthly regressions 
from 1963 to 2011. In each month we run the following regression: 
!"#$ = & + ( ln(1 + ./)$ +1 ln(1 + ./)$ × /3 + 4/3 + B ln(1 + ./)$×CDE:9FG	
+ HCDE:9FG	 +I6789*#:9)$7
;
7<=
+ >, 
Eq. (2) 
where Reti is the monthly raw return; AG is firm asset growth; GT indicates firm growth type (1 
for growth, -1 for mature and o for the rest); LIproxy is a proxy of either limits to arbitrage or 
investment frictions. Firms are sorted into deciles based on the three growth-type proxies – 
retained earnings scaled by total assets (RE), dividends scaled by income before extraordinary 
items (DIV) and cash flow scaled by total assets (CF), shown in Panels A, B and C respectively; 
the top and bottom three deciles are defined as mature and growth firms respectively for RE, 
DIV and CF. Models 1 to 5 report the interaction effect of growth type and asset growth by 
controlling for the five limits-to-arbitrage proxies – respectively idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), 
bid–ask spread (BAS), analyst coverage (COV), analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) and dollar 
trading volume (DVOL). Models 6 and 7 report the interaction effect of growth type and asset 
growth by controlling for the two investment friction proxies – respectively firm age (AGE) and 
firm total assets (TA). Control variables are the natural logarithm of book-to-market ratio 
(lnBM), the natural logarithm of market value (lnMV), and the previous 6-month returns at the 
end of June (PRE6RET). t-values in parentheses are based on Newey–West (1987) standard 
errors, correcting for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4. Continued 
Panel A: Growth-type proxy RE 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 1.95*** 1.01** 2.20*** 2.15*** 1.54* 2.07*** 2.10*** 
 
(8.70) (2.33) (5.08) (5.40) (1.89) (5.80) (6.58) 
ln(1+AG) 0.32 –0.20 –0.86** 0.05 0.15 –0.54 –1.38** 
 
(0.83) (–0.50) (–2.57) (0.16) (0.32) (–0.91) (–2.30) 
ln(1+AG)*GT –0.63* –1.34*** –0.80 –1.14** –0.79** –1.00*** –0.73** 
 
(–1.69) (–2.86) (–1.47) (–2.05) (–2.40) (–2.95) (–2.22) 
ln(1+AG)*IVOL –5.20 
      
 
(–1.56) 
      
ln(1+AG)*BAS 
 
10.45 
     
  
(–0.82) 
     
ln(1+AG)*COV 
  
0.02 
    
   
(1.04) 
    
ln(1+AG)*DISP 
   
–10.25 
   
    
(–0.91) 
   
ln(1+AG)*DVOL 
    
0.14 
  
     
(1.43) 
  
ln(1+AG)*AGE 
     
0.01 
 
      
(0.07) 
 
ln(1+AG)*TA 
      
0.23** 
       
(2.15) 
GT –0.13 –0.07 0.00 0.12 –0.08 –0.09 –0.13 
 
(–1.10) (–0.30) (0.01) –0.53 (–0.58) (–0.60) (–0.83) 
IVOL 1.61 
      
 
(1.07) 
      
BAS 
 
8.09 
     
  
(1.30) 
     
COV 
  
0.00 
    
   
(0.58) 
    
DISP 
   
–5.07** 
   
    
(–2.35) 
   
DVOL 
    
–0.06 
  
     
(–0.80) 
  
AGE 
     
0.01 
 
      
(0.16) 
 
TA 
      
0.09 
       
(1.11) 
lnBM 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.12* 0.16** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.08 
 
(4.04) (2.74) (1.80) (2.32) (4.26) (3.99) (1.19) 
lnMV –0.13*** 0.04 –0.15*** –0.12*** –0.07 –0.14*** –0.24*** 
 
(–4.15) (0.78) (–2.69) (–2.71) (–0.82) (–3.80) (–3.08) 
PRE6RET 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.27 0.16 0.22 
  (0.59) (0.46) (0.50) (0.33) (1.60) (0.90) (1.20) 
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Table 4. Continued 
Panel B: Growth-type proxy DIV 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 1.48*** 1.25*** 1.65*** 1.57*** 0.97 1.52*** 1.70*** 
 
(7.66) (3.23) (4.39) (4.61) (1.35) (5.32) (6.60) 
ln(1+AG) 0.07 0.04 –0.46 0.00 0.32 –1.25* –1.91*** 
 
(0.18) (0.08) (–1.27) (0.01) (0.84) (–1.68) (–3.35) 
ln(1+AG)*GT –0.31 –1.07* –0.45 –0.66 –1.01*** –0.63** –0.79** 
 
(–0.88) (–1.95) (–0.99) (–1.34) (–3.26) (–2.00) (–2.54) 
ln(1+AG)*IVOL –10.10** 
      
 
(–2.00) 
      
ln(1+AG)*BAS 
 
–48.72 
     
  
(–1.61) 
     
ln(1+AG)*COV 
  
–0.00 
    
   
(–0.24) 
    
ln(1+AG)*DISP 
   
–12.26 
   
    
(–1.25) 
   
ln(1+AG)*DVOL 
    
0.24*** 
  
     
(2.76) 
  
ln(1+AG)*AGE 
     
0.05 
 
      
(0.28) 
 
ln(1+AG)*TA 
      
0.24** 
       
(2.57) 
GT 0.18** 0.32** 0.30*** 0.35*** 0.27*** 0.22** 0.24** 
 
(2.07) (2.39) (2.70) (3.02) (3.07) (2.24) (2.47) 
IVOL 1.55 
      
 
(0.85) 
      
BAS 
 
2.00 
     
  
(0.23) 
     
COV 
  
0.00 
    
   
(0.75) 
    
DISP 
   
–1.62 
   
    
(–0.97) 
   
DVOL 
    
–0.08 
  
     
(–1.30) 
  
AGE 
     
0.02 
 
      
(0.72) 
 
TA 
      
–0.01 
       
(–0.22) 
lnBM 0.06* 0.00 0.02 0.09* 0.08** 0.06 0.04 
 
(1.78) (0.01) (0.39) (1.65) (2.08) (1.60) (0.79) 
lnMV –0.08*** –0.05 –0.09* –0.07* –0.01 –0.10*** –0.09 
 
(–2.91) (–0.92) (–1.86) (–1.74) (–0.16) (–3.12) (–1.37) 
PRE6RET 0.64*** 0.79*** 0.53** 0.48** 0.69*** 0.64*** 0.63*** 
  (3.27) (3.18) (2.38) (2.05) (3.48) (3.12) (3.09) 
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Table 4. Continued 
Panel C: Growth-type proxy CF 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 2.43*** 1.78*** 2.34*** 2.26*** 1.77** 2.33*** 2.66*** 
 
(9.34) (3.39) (4.76) (5.10) (2.16) (6.44) (7.93) 
ln(1+AG) –0.42 –0.62* –0.69** –0.22 –0.25 –0.80 –2.43*** 
 
(–1.29) (–1.76) (–2.40) (–0.79) (–0.82) (–1.48) (–3.49) 
ln(1+AG)*GT –0.80*** –0.70 –0.29 –0.41 0.01 –0.83*** –0.02 
 
(–2.59) (–1.50) (–0.71) (–0.88) (0.04) (–2.93) (–0.05) 
ln(1+AG)*IVOL –2.10 
      
 
(–0.71) 
      
ln(1+AG)*BAS 
 
–7.78 
     
  
(–0.38) 
     
ln(1+AG)*COV 
  
0.01 
    
   
(0.62) 
    
ln(1+AG)*DISP 
   
–19.26** 
   
    
(–2.04) 
   
ln(1+AG)*DVOL 
    
0.27*** 
  
     
(2.94) 
  
ln(1+AG)*AGE 
     
–0.04 
 
      
(–0.39) 
 
ln(1+AG)*TA 
      
0.29*** 
       
(2.69) 
GT –0.37*** –0.71*** –0.44** –0.37* –0.42*** –0.33** –0.43*** 
 
(–2.77) (–2.93) (–2.20) (–1.72) (–2.90) (–2.16) (–2.82) 
IVOL 0.58 
      
 
(0.42) 
      
BAS 
 
13.46* 
     
  
(1.95) 
     
COV 
  
0.00 
    
   
(0.79) 
    
DISP 
   
–2.44 
   
    
(–1.29) 
   
DVOL 
    
–0.10 
  
     
(–1.27) 
  
AGE 
     
0.06 
 
      
(1.33) 
 
TA 
      
–0.05 
       
(–0.76) 
lnBM 0.08** 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07* 0.08* 0.10* 
 
(2.14) (0.51) (0.69) (0.90) (1.84) (1.86) (1.68) 
lnMV –0.19*** –0.09 –0.17*** –0.14*** –0.11 –0.19*** –0.17** 
 
(–6.05) (–1.39) (–2.95) (–3.13) (–1.24) (–5.55) (–2.35) 
PRE6RET 0.21 0.11 0.36* 0.35* 0.32* 0.26 0.24 
  (1.21) (0.56) (1.77) (1.67) (1.88) (1.48) (1.44) 
  
40 
 
Table 5. Returns and the asset growth anomaly for growth sequence portfolios 
This table presents the average monthly raw returns (in %) and asset growth slopes for different 
asset growth sequences. To form the sequence groups, firms are sorted into deciles based on 
asset growth rate; the top (bottom) two deciles in each year are defined as high (low) asset 
growth. Firm asset growth is then traced back to identify the length of high- (low-) growth 
sequence at year end t. Firms in a high (low) decile in year t and also in year t-1, but not in year 
t-2, are placed in the H1 (L1) group; the H2 (L2), H3 (L3) and H4 (L4) groups are similarly 
constructed according to sequence length. Panel A reports the average monthly return in the 12 
months after the formation period. Panel B reports the asset growth slope coefficients from the 
regression of monthly returns on asset growth, the natural logarithm of book-to-market ratio, the 
natural logarithm of market value, and the previous 6-month returns at the end of June. The 
regressions are performed on portfolios including stocks in high (H), low (L) and both H and L 
sequence groups. t-values are based on Newey–West (1987) standard errors, correcting for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Diff(4 - 1) reports the test for the difference between the 
statistics in Sequences 4 and 1. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
Panel A: Hedged returns 
Sequence H L Diff (L-H) 
1 0.86 1.70 0.83*** 
2 0.73 2.01 1.28*** 
3 0.36 1.78 1.42*** 
4 0.36 2.09 1.73*** 
Diff (4-1) –0.50*** 0.38** 0.90*** 
Panel B: Asset growth slopes 
Sequence H L H&L 
1 –1.18*** 0.23 –1.06*** 
2 –0.77 –2.02* –1.00*** 
3 –3.65** –0.96 –1.55*** 
4 –7.94* –1.61 –2.37*** 
Diff (4-1) –6.76* –1.83 –1.31* 
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Table 6. Growth sequence, limits-to-arbitrage and investment frictions 
This table reports the time-series average of the estimated coefficients of monthly regressions 
from 1963 to 2011. In each month we run the following regression: 
!"#$ = & + ( ln(1 + ./)$ +1= ln(1 + ./)$ × JKLℎ	N"OP"*Q" + 1R ln(1 + ./)$ ×
C9S	N"OP"*Q" + 4=JKLℎ	N"OP"*Q" + 4RC9S	N"OP"*Q" + B)*	(1 + ./)$×CDE:9FG +
HCDE:9FG	 + ∑ 6789*#:9)$7;7<= + >, 
Eq. (3) 
where Reti is the monthly raw return; AG is firm asset growth; High (Low) sequence indicates the 
length of a high (low) asset growth sequence; LIproxy is a proxy of either limits to arbitrage or 
investment frictions. Models 2 to 6 report the interaction effect of growth type and asset growth 
by controlling for the five limits-to-arbitrage proxies – respectively idiosyncratic volatility 
(IVOL), bid–ask spread (BAS), analyst coverage (COV), analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) and 
dollar trading volume (DVOL). Models 7 and 8 report the interaction effect of growth type and 
asset growth by controlling for the two investment friction proxies – respectively firm age (AGE) 
and firm total assets (TA). Control variables are the natural logarithm of book-to-market ratio 
(lnBM), the natural logarithm of market value (lnMV), and the previous 6-month returns at the 
end of June (PRE6RET). t-values in parentheses are based on Newey–West (1987) standard 
errors, correcting for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 6. Continued 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept 1.85*** 1.76*** 1.42*** 2.05*** 1.94*** 1.85*** 1.98*** 1.94*** 
 
(5.02) (6.93) (3.38) (4.27) (4.53) (4.68) (4.73) (5.17) 
ln(1+AG) –0.79*** 0.07 –0.66** –0.67** 0.14 –0.38 –2.50*** –2.07*** 
 
(–3.79) (0.24) (–2.00) (–2.31) (0.42) (–1.13) (–4.24) (–4.77) 
ln(1+AG)*High –0.25** –0.17 –0.30** –0.25* –0.21 –0.33*** –0.18 –0.26** 
 
(–2.22) (–1.50) (–1.99) (–1.84) (–1.46) (–3.04) (–1.58) (–2.32) 
ln(1+AG)*Low –0.29 –0.08 0.56 –0.35 –1.05 –0.35 –0.20 –0.08 
 
(–1.00) (–0.29) (1.27) (–0.68) (–1.06) (–1.20) (–0.71) (–0.27) 
ln(1+AG)*IVOL 
 
–6.83*** 
      
  
(–2.96) 
      
ln(1+AG)*BAS 
  
–10.12 
     
   
(–1.07) 
     
ln(1+AG)*COV 
   
0.02* 
    
    
(1.70) 
    
ln(1+AG)*DISP 
    
–28.93*** 
   
     
(–3.12) 
   
ln(1+AG)*DVOL 
     
0.11 
  
      
(1.64) 
  
ln(1+AG)*AGE 
      
0.20*** 
 
       
(2.63) 
 
ln(1+AG)*TA 
       
0.26*** 
        
(3.44) 
High sequence –0.07 –0.10* –0.03 –0.07 –0.08 –0.08 –0.09 –0.07 
 
(–1.18) (–1.94) (–0.28) (–1.22) (–1.28) (–1.34) (–1.51) (–1.12) 
Low sequence 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.06 
 
(0.72) (1.14) (0.74) (0.79) (1.29) (0.86) (0.82) (1.18) 
IVOL 
 
0.39 
      
  
(0.26) 
      
BAS 
  
3.92 
     
   
(0.86) 
     
COV 
   
0.00 
    
    
(0.39) 
    
DISP 
    
–0.77 
   
     
(–0.53) 
   
DVOL 
     
–0.29** 
  
      
(–2.08) 
  
AGE 
      
–0.01 
 
       
(–0.86) 
 
TA 
       
–0.01 
        
(–0.20) 
lnBM 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.13** 0.07 0.09 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.13** 
 
(3.10) (3.46) (2.00) (1.27) (1.54) (3.41) (3.17) (2.32) 
lnMV –0.09** –0.09*** –0.03 –0.13** –0.10** –0.09** –0.09** –0.10 
 
(–2.41) (–2.92) (–0.72) (–2.22) (–2.31) (–2.00) (–2.37) (–1.21) 
PRE6RET 0.09 0.08 –0.08 0.20 0.22 0.10 0.09 0.09 
  (0.62) (0.56) (–0.56) (1.15) (1.18) (0.66) (0.61) (0.58) 
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Table 7. Asset growth effect by growth sequence with control of past growth 
This table reports the asset growth effect regression by asset growth sequence with additional 
control of past growth. Asset growth slopes are from the regression of monthly returns on 
current and three lags of asset growth, the natural logarithm of book-to-market ratio (lnBM), the 
natural logarithm of market value (lnMV), and the previous 6-month returns at the end of June 
(PRE6RET). The regressions are performed on portfolios including stocks in both High and 
Low (H and L) sequence groups. To form the sequence groups, firms are sorted into deciles 
based on asset growth rate; the top (bottom) two deciles in each year are defined as high (low) 
asset growth. Firm asset growth is then traced back to identify the length of high- (low-) growth 
sequence at year end t. Firms in a high (low) decile in year t and also in year t-1, but not in year 
t-2, are placed in the H1 (L1) group; the H2 (L2), H3 (L3) and H4 (L4) groups are similarly 
constructed according to sequence length. t-values are based on Newey–West (1987) standard 
errors, correcting for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 Sequence = 4  Sequence = 3  Sequence = 2  Sequence = 1 
  Slope t 
 
Slope t 
 
Slope t 
 
Slope t 
Intercept 2.85*** 3.58 
 
2.42*** 4.41 
 
2.00*** 4.60 
 
1.95*** 4.39 
ln(1+AG) –1.74* –1.92 
 
–1.63** –2.38 
 
–0.87*** –5.01 
 
–0.93*** –4.91 
ln(1+AG)_lag1 1.87 1.37 
 
0.36 0.54 
 
–0.48*** –2.89 
 
–0.59* –1.66 
ln(1+AG)_lag2 –2.09 –1.00 
 
–0.05 –0.08 
 
0.03 0.13 
 
0.13 0.50 
ln(1+AG)_lag3 –1.16 –0.73 
 
1.39** 2.20 
 
–0.13 –0.67 
 
–0.50** –2.05 
lnBM 0.19 0.78 
 
0.26* 1.77 
 
0.11* 1.72 
 
0.08 1.08 
lnMV –0.28** –2.06 
 
–0.20** –2.25 
 
–0.09** –2.10 
 
–0.09* –1.89 
PRE6RET –0.66 –1.16   –0.17 –0.39   0.10 0.54   0.08 0.39 
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Table 8. Asset growth and the contemporary return relationship 
This table reports the time-series average of the estimated coefficients of monthly regressions 
from 1963 to 2011. The dependent variable is the monthly raw return between t-18 and t-6, 
where t is the asset growth formation month (every June). AG is firm asset growth. Control 
variables are the natural logarithm of book-to-market ratio (lnBM), the natural logarithm of 
market value (lnMV), and the previous 6-month returns at the end of June (PRE6RET). Panel A 
reports the regression with growth type, where GT indicates firm growth type (1 for growth, -1 
for mature and 0 for the rest). Firm growth-type classification is as described in Table 2. Panel B 
reports the regression with growth sequence and additional control of past growth up to three 
lags. Growth sequence portfolio formation is as described in Table 5. t-values are based on 
Newey–West (1987) standard errors, correcting for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. *, ** 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Panel A: Growth type effect 
  RE DIV CF 
Intercept 1.34*** 0.86*** 1.33*** 
 
(4.63) (3.56) (4.05) 
ln(1+AG) 3.30*** 0.80*** 1.89*** 
 
(11.51) (3.47) (7.88) 
ln(1+AG)*GT –0.33 1.62*** 1.17*** 
 
(–0.94) (4.73) (3.85) 
GT –0.53*** 0.97*** –0.64*** 
 
(–3.18) (8.41) (–4.27) 
lnBM –1.07*** –0.61*** –0.91*** 
 
(–20.68) (–16.44) (–19.46) 
lnMV –0.13*** –0.05* –0.09*** 
 
(–3.70) (–1.79) (–2.60) 
PRE6RET 1.45*** 1.45*** 1.44*** 
  (7.05) (6.33) (6.84) 
Panel B: Growth sequence effect 
 Sequence = 4  Sequence = 3  Sequence = 2  Sequence = 1 
 
Slope t 
 
Slope t 
 
Slope t 
 
Slope t 
Intercept 3.35*** 2.96 
 
1.89*** 3.41 
 
1.18*** 2.77 
 
1.03** 2.29 
ln(1+AG) 4.44* 1.88 
 
3.39*** 6.10 
 
2.78*** 13.48 
 
2.74*** 13.68 
ln(1+AG)_lag1 –1.71 –0.92 
 
–2.55*** –4.10 
 
–1.97*** –10.05 
 
–2.23*** –8.57 
ln(1+AG)_lag2 –1.58 –0.65 
 
–1.45** –2.25 
 
–1.54*** –6.68 
 
–1.48*** –6.43 
ln(1+AG)_lag3 –2.13 –0.69 
 
–0.01 –0.02 
 
–0.34* –1.82 
 
–0.37** –2.00 
lnBM –0.79 –1.17 
 
–1.35*** –7.82 
 
–1.20*** –16.05 
 
–1.37*** –15.82 
lnMV –0.30* –1.68 
 
–0.11 –1.37 
 
–0.01 –0.24 
 
0.00 0.02 
PRE6RET 0.97 0.44   0.99** 2.35   1.23*** 6.61   1.20*** 5.80 
 
